


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**SEEKING A FINAL VICTORY:  
CREATING CONDITIONS  
FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEON H. RIOS**  
United States Army

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Military victory alone does not resolve the conflict that precipitates the use of force.

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Theoretical concepts and an historical example are examined to provide the intellectual basis for a model that describes a method to establish the preconditions for conflict resolution. The model focuses on the purpose of a state in a conflict, which is to cause change in an opponent. The model concludes that the change, which is a pre-requisite for conflict resolution, has to be substantial enough to cause both states to willingly agree or compromise so the issue is no longer contestable. The study offers conclusions and recommendations for further study. The project is not intended to be a final product; however, it should serve to incite further research and discussion about conflict resolution among students and practitioners of strategy.

## USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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### SEEKING A FINAL VICTORY: CREATING CONDITIONS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

#### AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Leon H. Rios  
United States Army

Colonel Bruce B.G. Clarke  
Project Adviser

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## Abstract

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Leon Rios

# Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Section I: An Introduction to the Problem.....	1
Statement of the Problem.....	3
Goals of the Paper.....	3
Scope of the Paper.....	3
Section II: Review of Theory.....	4
Theoretical Concepts.....	4
What is Conflict?.....	4
Conflict Motivation.....	5
Regulating Conflict.....	6
Strategies for Conflict.....	7
Escalating Conflict.....	8
Concept of Absoluteness in Conflict.....	9
Intractable Conflict and Accommodation.....	10
Force in a Conflict.....	10
Conflict Transformation.....	13
Conflict Termination.....	14
Conflict Resolution.....	15
The Difficulty with Conflict Resolution.....	16
Questions of Problems Associated with Conflict Resolution.....	17
Section III: An Examination of a Historical Example.....	19
Synopsis of Historical Example.....	20
Analysis of Historical Example Using Questions Developed in Section II.....	29
Conclusions.....	35
Section IV: A Conflict Resolution Model.....	36

Initiating the Conflict Resolution Process.....	36
Escalating Conflict to Achieve Resolution.....	39
Resolving Conflict.....	41
Summary.....	44
 Section IV: Application of the Conflict Resolution Model.....	 45
Art and Science in Conflict.....	45
What Causes Transformation in Conflict.....	46
The Strategic Paradox.....	49
Summary.....	52
 Section V: Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Study.....	 53
List of Tables:	
Table 1. Initiating the Conflict Resolution Process.....	38
Table 2. Escalating Conflict to Achieve Resolution.....	40
Table 3. Resolving the Conflict.....	42
Table 4. Summary of the Conflict Resolution Process.....	44
Table 5. Fisher's Circle Chart: Four Steps in Inventing Options.....	48
 Endnotes.....	 59
 Appendix A: Woito's "Causes of War".....	 63
 Appendix B: Handel's "Decisions to Terminate or not to Terminate Hostilities".....	 65
 Appendix C: Wedge's Conflict Management Continuum.....	 67
 Bibliography.....	 69



## An Introduction to the Problem

"When the world is at peace, a gentleman keeps his sword by his side."<sup>1</sup>

Sun Tzu

"He that endureth to the end shall be saved, and we shall endure to the end, let the war last months or years or longer. Still, we must not cherish any illusions that this is the Final War."<sup>2</sup>

Sir John Hammerton, March 20 1918

The opening of the Iron Curtain signaled the end of a costly Cold War that consumed the efforts of three generations of Americans. Initial assessments were hopeful, "peace was at hand" and it was time to reap the benefits of 43 years of American investment to contain and defeat communism. Accordingly, the United States reduced its military strength in Europe, and around the world, as the Soviet military was no longer a threat.

However, as the Cold War faded, other conflicts came to the fore. Suppressed initially during WWII, and then by communist regimes, old European regional conflicts are resurgent and unchecked. The resurgence of old conflicts verifies Clausewitz's admonition that "the ultimate outcome of a war is not always regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date."<sup>3</sup> With the end of the Cold War, political conditions in Eastern Europe are right to settle old disputes.

Soon after the Iron Curtain opened, Iraq invaded Kuwait requiring the U.S. to respond.

Operations in Southwest Asia produced a tremendous military victory as the U.S. - led coalition forces ejected Iraq from Kuwait in a 100 hour ground war. Yet, despite the destruction of a significant portion of its military, Iraq continues to claim victory. Is it possible that the measure of success for Saddam Hussein and Iraq extend beyond the effects of the 100 hour ground war? Did the U.S. and the coalition fight the "right fight" in Southwest Asia, or did the U.S. miss the mark as Richard Hobbs indicates when he says...

We tend to fight for war's sake and disregard their effects -- much like a football game, as soon as it's over, everybody wants to go home. But the important part is just commencing when the war is over, for that is when the purposes of the war are either fulfilled or lost. Each time we went home and still did not understand why we lost the peace.<sup>4</sup>

It seems that the U.S. - led coalition focused on a short - term victory in Southwest Asia, developed the illusion of overcoming the enemy, claimed victory, went home, and left Saddam Hussein to recuperate and resume his efforts.

Notwithstanding recent victories in the Cold War and in Southwest Asia, current U.S. military strategy assumes that the potential exists for becoming involved in a conflict because of regional instability. One reason is support for the United Nations, which may cause the U.S. to commit its military as in Somalia. If the U.S. becomes involved in another armed conflict, how does it keep the conflict from becoming a protracted one? How does the U.S. establish the criteria for success in such a conflict to achieve the Clausewitzian concept of "final victory" which is paraphrased below:

...in every victory there is a culminating point beyond which lies the realm of losses and defeats... there is only one result that counts: *final victory*. Until then nothing is decided, nothing won, and nothing lost... analysis must extend to the ultimate objective, which is to bring about peace... the end that crowns the work.<sup>5</sup>

The problem seems to be that the United States does not understand how to achieve a "final victory." short - term military victories have not provided a desired, long-term peace. While the United States has amassed several military victories over the last ninety years, it has not been successful at resolving the conflicts that precipitated the use of force. Unfortunately, it appears that the U.S. has treated symptoms rather than the causes of conflict. Is the U.S. losing the peace because it has not been successful in resolving conflicts? Will the U.S. fight again? For what reasons... to resolve new or old conflicts? If the potential for conflict has increased, then U.S. strategists need to better understand how to bring a conflict to successful resolution... the focus of this paper.

The goals of this paper are:

1. To analyze theory and history to develop an intellectual basis for understanding conflict resolution.
2. To generalize a model that describes the conflict process.
3. To invite questions for continued study of conflict resolution.
4. To provide feasible recommendations for further study of conflict resolution.

The scope of the paper is at the strategic level and addresses the problems of entering, escalating, terminating, and resolving a conflict. This study is not intended to be a final product; however, it should serve to incite further research and discussion about conflict resolution among

students and practitioners of strategy.

## A Review of Theory

"Wars usually begin and end in politics"<sup>6</sup>

Lord Hankey

It is true that answers to current problems lie in history; however, history will not provide answers unless the right questions are asked. Theory provides the intellectual basis to know what questions to ask. The intent of this section is to review theory applicable to conflict resolution in order to generate questions that will focus study of historical and contemporary conflict resolution problems.

### Theoretical Concepts.

This paper focuses on theoretical concepts which apply to conflict resolution. The twelve concepts provided within this paper serve to develop a basic understanding of what conflict is, how it works, and how it is resolved.

What is Conflict? There is no single description of what conflict is. Morton Deutsch describes conflict as "pervasive and inevitable," the medium through which problems are aired and solutions are arrived at as two or more parties "attempt to introduce change into their existing mode of relationship."<sup>7</sup> Bryant Wedge describes the essence of conflict as "incompatible

interests," i.e., "what one party wants, the other has, and so on."<sup>8</sup> Robert Woito describes conflict as inevitably woven into any society in which economic resources are scarce; prestige or status limited or inaccurately perceived; or in which individuals misunderstand each other.<sup>9</sup> Deutsch indicates that the likelihood of conflict is enhanced between two or more parties when "they have opportunity to interact; their interaction makes salient differences between them which they perceive to be incompatible; and they judge that there is more to gain or less to lose by active efforts to eliminate or reduce the incompatibilities."<sup>10</sup> If conflict persists, then it could evolve to become an antagonistic struggle and, as T.R. Gurr describes, it could be either "manifest or latent" and employ coercive behaviors designed to "otherwise control their opponents."<sup>11</sup> The definition used in this paper is a conclusion reached from all the above: **Conflict is the tension created among two or more parties because of fundamental differences in truths, values, or interests.**

Conflict Motivation: What causes states to become involved in a conflict? Woito provides a comprehensive list of different causes for states to engage in a conflict (see appendix A). To understand the utility, or benefit, that a state anticipates in a conflict is to understand a state's motivation for conflict. The greater the utility or benefit, the greater is the motivation to participate in a conflict. The measure of utility or benefit of conflict is the gain, or the prevention of loss, with respect to a given value, truth, or interest. The greater the benefit, the more willing a state is to assume risk. Risk is manifest in the commitment a state willingly makes to achieve its political objective. The greater the motivation to gain, or to prevent loss, the greater is the

commitment to reduce the risk of failure. If the cost for reducing risk of failure exceeds the perceived benefit, then motivation to continue the conflict will wane. **The more critical a value, truth, or interest, the greater the motivation to become involved in, and sustain conflict**

**Regulating Conflict:** A state must be capable of regulating its activities in order to attain its objectives and benefit from a conflict. An authority must be recognized to act on behalf of a state in interstate relations. Normally, a recognized authority is empowered to develop and enforce policies that reflect the state's values, truths, and interests. State policies serve as the basis for interaction and conflict with other states. An authority must be capable of modifying policy as necessary to guide a state as it works to achieve its objectives in a conflict. Similarly, a state authority determines if the benefit of continued effort in a conflict is worth anticipated costs. Accordingly, the state authority seeks optimal opportunities to offer, or to accept offers for, conflict termination and resolution. The process a state follows to determine appropriate policy while in a conflict is similar to that outlined in Michael Handel's conflict termination decision criteria (see appendix B).

A state's decisive authority must be maintained throughout a conflict, particularly when termination and resolution are possible. It must be clear who represents a state that is joined in a conflict. Without a recognized authority, a state is subject to internal conflict and lacks decisive capability. If a state's authoritative infrastructure is destroyed, then a recognized authority has to be reestablished before a conflict can be resolved. **A conflict resolution that is achieved without there being a recognized decisive authority to execute the terms of the resolution**

**will be short-lived.**

Strategies for Conflict: It is necessary to identify how states are to proceed once joined in a conflict. Deutsch describes three strategies for conflict which include: a cooperative strategy which seeks a "win - win," collaborative result with both sides expecting to gain from the conflict; an individualistic strategy where a state seeks a "win" without concern for what the other side achieves; and finally, a competitive strategy which pursues an adversarial, "win - lose" relationship with one side expecting to gain at the expense of the other.<sup>12</sup> Deutsch indicates that the nature of conflict is determined by the conditions that give rise to cooperative (constructive) or competitive (destructive) strategies for conflict.<sup>13</sup> There is a high probability that a conflict will be resolved by a cooperative strategy if a conflict develops between two states that normally have a cooperative relationship (i.e., U.S. and U.K.). Conversely, a competitive strategy will likely ensue if a conflict develops between two states that do not normally have cooperative relations, or have a history of competitive conflict (i.e., China and Vietnam). A cooperative strategy encourages agreements between states with respect to interests, values, and truths to preclude development of competitive strategies. Notwithstanding the benefit of cooperative strategies for conflict, competitive strategies are more prevalent. Moreover, competitive strategies for conflict are the most exhaustive, and cause the most difficulty for resolution. Motivation is the prime determinant in the selection of a strategy for a conflict. The greater the anticipated benefit, or utility, the greater is the motivation for conflict and the more likely is a state willing to pursue a competitive strategy.

Escalating Conflict: Tolerance begins to wane and the potential for escalation is increased as states attempt to mutually resolve conflicts to their own benefit. Wedge's conflict management continuum provides a series of options that include "fermentation, confrontation, violence, and escalation to war (see appendix C)." States have the option to confront each other, to escalate, or to back down to a lower state along the continuum. However, the decision to escalate or deescalate must be a reciprocal process. Escalation, and the reciprocal reaction, tests a state's motivation. The greater the motivation, the more likely the state will attempt to achieve an advantageous position until it either wins or loses the means to continue. Unless escalation consists of "an extraordinarily powerful move," it will not be successful in terminating a conflict by itself.<sup>14</sup> If one state is intent on escalation, the options for the other are limited to similar escalation or capitulation.

States in a conflict are in equilibrium until one assumes a more advantageous position with the intent to cause its opposition to yield. The concept of equilibrium is described by Clausewitz:

When neither side has a positive aim, a state of rest and equilibrium results; equilibrium, naturally, in its widest sense, covering not only physical and psychological forces, but all circumstances and motives... [until] one side adopts a new and positive aim and begins to pursue it however tentatively...<sup>15</sup>

The decision to escalate disrupts the equilibrium between states in a conflict. **Escalation creates a condition of crisis for the disadvantaged state.** The crisis requires quick decisions such as: capitulation; reciprocation to re-establish equilibrium; counter - escalation to assume a position of greater advantage; or, to change the state's view on the conflict issue. The decisions required



while in a crisis condition are a function of policy. The process of escalation to create a crisis, and the decisions required thereafter, is what Clausewitz refers to as the "real war."<sup>16</sup> The "real war" determines the future of a conflict by political interaction of states. If a state lacks a viable policy for its conduct in a conflict, or believes that there are no acceptable alternatives, then the reciprocal process of "move - counter move" often causes governments to drive towards absolute commitment in a conflict.

The Concept of Absoluteness in Conflict: Escalation causes a crisis which requires a state to reciprocate, change, capitulate, or to counter - escalate to a position of advantage. The decision by a state to escalate is based upon its objectives and the resources it has available. A state that receives popular support as it commits all elements of its power to include diplomatic, economic, and military means has approached the absolute level of war... there is nothing else to give to the effort. Clausewitz describes the concept of absolute commitment as a concern of the people as a whole when he says:

There seem[s] to be no end to the resources mobilized; all limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown by the governments and their subjects. Various factors powerfully [increase] that vigor: the vastness of available resources, the ample field of opportunity, and the depth of feeling generally aroused. The sole aim of war [is] to overthrow the opponent. Not until he [is] prostrate [is] it considered possible to pause and try to reconcile the opposing interests.<sup>17</sup>

In Clausewitz's observation of Napoleonic warfare, France waged absolute war as the national will and resources were mobilized to fight "without respite until the enemy succumbed."<sup>18</sup>

Absoluteness in conflict is exhausting and may serve to destabilize the state in a prolonged

conflict where the political goal is not achieved. For this reason, Clausewitz reminds us that the character of a conflict is determined on the "basis of its political probabilities."<sup>19</sup> If a conflict is going to require the absolute commitment of a state, then it is imperative "not to take the first step [toward the absolute commitment of a state] without considering the last."<sup>20</sup> The questions of conflict motivation and regulation come to the fore: is the anticipated benefit worth the cost; is the benefit achievable; how is the benefit going to be gained; where is the point of diminishing returns where the cost exceeds the benefit; and, what objectives will guide the absolute commitment of a state to achieve its desired end? Attainment of the desired end is the "last step" in the conflict process. The conflict continues until the "last step" is taken to produce an agreement, compromise or change with respect to the value, truth or interest in a conflict.

Intractable Conflict and Accommodation: Not all differences about values or truths can be agreed to, compromised, or changed by opposing states. For example, conflict is intractable if it centers on values or truths based on absolute religious faith. Whereas the social context of a religious conflict is likely to change over time, change in the absolute religious faith at the center of the conflict is not likely. Louis Kriesberg indicates that the solution for intractable conflict is accommodation; that is, agreeing not to disagree on intractable issues while isolating and addressing other issues that can be resolved.<sup>21</sup> Escalation and a drive to absoluteness in a conflict over intractable issues will not result in agreement about a value or the truth in question. Extermination may be the outcome, as in Bosnia.

Force in a Conflict: Motivation drives a state to use force as part of a competitive

strategy for a conflict. The threat of the use of force in an escalating conflict either coerces an opponent to do the other's will or causes a reciprocal threat for the use of force. Coercion is used to create an expectation of unacceptable cost. The desired effect of coercion is the reduction of an opponent's motivation for continuing the conflict. To be coercive, the threat of using force should be considered credible by the threatened state. Credibility is based upon the threatening state's perceived motivation, available resources and precedent. Unfortunately, coercion provokes the counter use of force, rather than facilitating deescalation, if the motivation for a conflict is equally high on both sides.

Measuring the use of force is a function of what Bruce B.G. Clarke describes as strategic vision.<sup>22</sup> Strategic vision defines the general and political situations desired after force is used and the conflict is resolved. Strategic vision provides the basis for the development of political and military objectives. Clarke identifies three "critical pieces of guidance" required as part of a vision for the use of force:

1. A clear statement by the political authorities of the desired situation in the post - hostility and settlement phases -- a vision of what the area should look like following the hostilities.
2. A clear set of political objectives that when achieved will allow the above vision to become reality.
3. A set of military objectives that will, when achieved, allow / cause the above to happen.<sup>23</sup>

Policy should dictate if and how force is to be used in a conflict. Policy also determines the measure of how force contributes to attaining political ends. Objectives derived from policy specify the criteria for successful application of force and identify terms for victory and capitulation. Clarke indicates that the objectives focus the effort against the opposition's political

and military centers of gravity with specific, "minimum acceptable" criteria for victory. By assessing "victory criteria," a state can assess a situation and identify opportunities for negotiation to terminate the use of force and resolve the conflict.<sup>24</sup> However, problems arise with the application of force. As a state employs force, it approaches the absolute level of commitment. A problem with absolute commitment is the tendency to focus on military victory rather than achieving the political end. Hanson Baldwin identifies common problems with states employing force as inflicting "absolute destruction," using "unlimited means," and mistaking "military victory for political victory."<sup>25</sup> If the political objective determines the conditions for the use of force, then the political objective should also describe how much force is applied. The application of too little force may result in failure while the application of too much force may fuel a costly drive for victory without regard for political purpose.

The terms for terminating the use of force should not be considered too harsh by the projected loser. The use of force will be protracted and conflict resolution will be thwarted if the terms are considered too harsh. Sun Tzu warns that "wild beasts, while at bay, fight desperately. How much more true is this of men! If they know there is no alternative they will fight to the death."<sup>26</sup> History is replete with examples of requirements for unconditional surrender that prolonged fighting and subverted the peace that was to ensue. Hobbs warns that military victories are not an end in and of themselves and we should not become victory minded and forget the kind of peace we are fighting for.<sup>27</sup> Liddel Hart's views are similar:

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war... a too complete victory inevitably complicates the problem of making a just and wise peace settlement."<sup>28</sup>

A state must understand what type of bargain will terminate the use of force in order to create the preconditions for a "just peace"... one that does not contain the germs of the next war.

Ikle' provides the following questions that a policy intended to terminate a conflict should

address:

[1] How long is it worthwhile to suffer -- and to inflict -- further casualties and destruction in order to accomplish the initial objectives of fighting? [2] When has the time come to make concessions, so as to avoid the losses of continued warfare? [3] Should the fighting go on to reduce the risk that the enemy will strike again in the future... or [4] can risk be better avoided by ending the war so that one's own and the enemy's population will suffer less and reconciliation might become easier?<sup>29</sup>

The decision to terminate the use of force is a reciprocal one. Terminating the use of force is based on motivation, a measure of objectives, and mutually acceptable terms for victory and capitulation.

Conflict Transformation: Conflict is a dynamic process. Conflict causes change. Change affects a state's view of the cause of the conflict. This dynamic process is called "transformation," as Peter Wallenstein explains:

Transformation of conflict is the result of the struggle itself where the contention transforms the parties, their interests and actions... Transformation may occur as a result of repeated experience involving struggle, victory, defeat, resolution. Transformation, in short, is a generalized learning from historical experience.<sup>30</sup>

Wallenstein theorizes that the Soviet rationale for continued struggle in the Cold War was redefined through a process of transformation. The Soviet transformation culminated with a

"substantial shift of purpose and party composition."<sup>31</sup> In essence, Wallenstein theorizes that the Soviet Union learned through an extended conflict with the West that continued conflict will be futile. Wallenstein contends that changes in the Soviet Union, now Russia, eliminated the potential for conflict escalation with the U.S.

The process of transformation, like a paradigm shift, is met by an overwhelming institutional resistance. Raimo Vayrynen explains that transformation is an arduous process because several complex changes could take place simultaneously within the same state. For example, leadership could be changing to present either a more moderate, or harsher view of the issue; the state's structure could change because of instability due to leadership changes or the protracted conflict's effects; the rules that govern conflict may change; and finally, the relative importance of the issue itself may be transforming.<sup>32</sup> **Transformation is a principal way to achieve resolution; therefore, understanding how to motivate an opponent to transform is the key to conflict resolution.** Motivation to transform in a conflict is relative to anticipated benefits and costs. A conflict continues until states agree, compromise, or change with respect to a value, truth or interest in conflict. The opportunities for transformation have to be created and not left to chance, else the conflict may be protracted. Transformations occur to satisfy a need within a state. Institutional resistance to transformation is overcome by satisfying the basic needs of a state. To resolve conflict, transformations have to eliminate differences between the states in a conflict.

**Conflict Termination:** Conflict termination does not mean that a conflict is resolved. For

example, agreeing not to disagree on an intractable issue may provide a respite; however, the issue may lie in the background to be resurrected at a later opportunity. Although the conflict may appear to be "dead," such cannot be confirmed until the policy that gave it life is verified as eliminated through an agreement, compromise or change with respect to the value, truth or interest in conflict. Therefore, it is essential to understand conditions that will spark the resurgence of a latent conflict.

**Conflict Resolution: The opportunities for transformation and conflict resolution are best presented at the time when a state is in a crisis condition.** Crisis erodes confidence. This is important because a state will not abandon its objectives and transform if the state anticipates success in the conflict. **The potential for transformation is increased during a crisis when a state determines that further efforts in a conflict will be futile.**

"Giving up" in a conflict may not be enough to cause resolution. The will to make peace could be nothing more than an attempt to take a "time out." Coser cautions that we must be careful to distinguish between the "will to make peace and the will to accept defeat."<sup>33</sup> The will to make peace is to terminate a conflict, whereas the will to accept defeat is to resolve a conflict. Thomas Kuhn indicates that accepting defeat is "...like admitting that they had been wrong and their opponents right."<sup>34</sup> Coser describes the difference between the willingness to accept peace versus defeat:

...parties to the conflict may be willing to cease the battle when they recognize that their aims cannot be attained or that they can be attained only at a price which they are not willing to pay, or more generally, when they conclude that continuation of the conflict is

less attractive than the making of peace. In neither of these cases would they be willing to accept defeat although they are willing to stop short of victory.<sup>35</sup>

Accepting defeat is essential to Wallensteen's description of conflict resolution as "a way of transcending a basic incompatibility between the parties in conflict in such a manner that they (voluntarily) express their satisfaction with the outcome."<sup>36</sup> To transcend basic incompatibilities requires that a transformation take place. Willing acceptance of defeat requires an internal change within the states in a conflict. The conflict continues until one state admits defeat and undergoes a transformation. The process of transformation is an essential element of conflict resolution. Resolution is not complete until states willingly agree, compromise, or change so that the initial value, truth or interest that was the source of the conflict is no longer an issue between the opponents.

The Difficulty with Conflict Resolution: This paper defines conflict as the tension created between two or more parties because of fundamental differences in truths, values, or interests. Accordingly, conflict is a dynamic process of affecting, and being affected by, conditions of crisis. A conflict requires constant assessment and policy modification. A conflict may escalate and continue if this is not clearly understood. Similarly, a conflict may continue if terms for resolution are not specified, understood, and accepted.

A state will not be likely to negotiate a resolution willingly as long as it is motivated and committed to "winning." The problem becomes one of determining how to change a state's motivation for continuing a conflict. The opportunity for offering resolution must be "ripe," but not too ripe; meaning that if the offer is made too soon, motivation is misjudged and invites



greater effort from an opponent, while a late offer places a lasting peace at risk.<sup>37</sup>

The prospects for conflict resolution are confounded if an opponent's crisis condition is not understood. Ikle' points out that a state engaged in a war is subjected to considerable "political upheavals" which complicate the prospect of ending a war and resolving the conflict.<sup>38</sup>

Moreover:

[a] government that tries to make peace with an enemy while facing military defeat will inevitably come apart at the seams... [Therefore] the losing nation's government must overcome a double crisis: it must grant the concessions that the enemy demands as the price for peace, and at the same time it must change its leadership and domestic support.<sup>39</sup>

Problems with conflict resolution center on the inability or unwillingness of opponents to communicate and ensure understanding during a conflict. Uncertainty, or lack of clarity, in communication between opponents may confuse, complicate, and protract a conflict. A lack of communication between states in a conflict will confound the resolution process.

#### Questions of Problems Associated with Conflict Resolution:

Theory has prompted the following questions which are pertinent to understanding how a resolution can be reached in a conflict. The questions are intended to provide focus for analysis of historical or contemporary problems of conflict resolution. The questions require validation in order to serve as an accurate measure of the actions taken to resolve conflict. The questions will be used to analyze one historical example within this paper. The questions include:

1. What are the fundamental differences in truths, values, or interests?
2. What are the expected benefits to be gained from the conflict? How much risk is acceptable to

the parties in the conflict in order to obtain the benefit? Are the issues critical for the continued survival or welfare of a state?

3. Are the states in a conflict capable of developing policies and objectives to terminate and resolve the conflict?
4. Is the motivation for involvement in the conflict great enough to cause a state to pursue a competitive strategy?
5. What conditions exist that entice one state to escalate and create a crisis for the other state(s).  
  
What caused the decision by the affected states to reciprocate or assume a position of advantage?
6. Can the states sustain absolute commitment to the conflict? What affect does absolute commitment have on the state and its political objectives? What limits are imposed by a state to complete the conflict resolution process by agreement, compromise, or change with respect to the value, truth or interest.
7. Are intractable issues the basis for a conflict that is escalating and driving toward absolute commitment? Is accommodation desirable or possible?
8. Are the states susceptible to being coerced or will coercion provoke the use of force rather than facilitate deescalation or conflict resolution?
9. Do policies and objectives serve to measure successful application of force and describe terms for the termination of the use of force?
10. Have states determined how much force is sufficient to accomplish the military mission

without jeopardizing the political purpose?

11. Has a conflict transformed... if so, how? How is transformation affecting the issue. Is

transformation likely to facilitate resolution or is the conflict remaining at a latent level?

12. How are states ensuring the willing and satisfactory agreement, compromise or change so that

a value, truth or interest is resolved and no longer an issue?

13. Why are states unable or unwilling to communicate with other states involved in a conflict to

ensure understanding about the issue of disagreement?

## An Examination of a Historical Example

"Nothing in the world is permanent, neither peace treaties nor laws. They come and they go; they change; *tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis*... But we do our duty in the present... whether it lasts is up to God."<sup>40</sup>

Otto Von Bismarck

The intent of this section is to examine how two states can resolve a conflict. This paper examines the successful resolution of a conflict between the Austrians and the Prussians in 1866. This example has been chosen because there are few occurrences of conflict resolution in recent history. Examination of a more complex, protracted conflict would be beyond the scope of this paper. However, the methodology could be applied to a more complex problem.

The method followed in this paper is to provide a brief synopsis of the conflict and then examine the resolution of the conflict by answering the questions developed in the previous

section of this paper.

*A Synopsis of The Austrian - Prussian War of 1866:*

By 1866, there had been a long standing jealousy between Austria and Prussia about control of German territories. The jealousies between Austria and Prussia stemmed from the growth of the Prussian state under the leadership of Frederick the Great at the expense of Maria Theresa of Austria. Jealousies were put aside for only a brief period when Austria and Prussia joined in a common effort with other allies to defeat Napoleon Bonaparte.

The German territories changed hands many times during the Napoleonic wars and the period immediately thereafter. The Prussians once held the territories between the Rhine and Elbe rivers; however, the territories were ceded to the French by the treaty of Tilsit after the French victory at Friedland in 1807. With the French defeat in 1815, parties to the Congress of Vienna formed the 36 German states into a loose Confederation and placed them under Austrian domination. The German states began to experience economic difficulties as they entered into trade markets dominated by other European economic powers. The German Confederation was ineffective in ensuring fair access to markets in Europe and abroad during this period of rapid industrial growth. Moreover, the Austrian Government did not concern itself with the economic problems of the German states. German merchants trading abroad were subject to the whim of the states with which they dealt. The German merchants did not have the benefit of being able to turn to a government representative for assistance. Frederick Engels contends that economic problems caused by the lack of representation by an effective German government fueled the

desire for German unification.<sup>41</sup>

A desire for ethnic unity among the German states complicated economic problems. Ethnic Germans in the northern, Danish controlled, German states of Schleswig - Holstein wanted a closer unity with central German states. In 1848, ethnic Germans in Schleswig - Holstein mounted a failed insurrection against the Danes who had sovereign rights over the states.

In 1848, the German Confederation collapsed and the German Princes formed a self appointed Assembly at Frankfurt to improve the German economic position in Europe. The Assembly drafted a constitution for an all - German state without Austrian influence and offered the German monarchy to the Prussian king. When the Prussian king refused the German crown in 1849, the German Assembly (which was riddled with inter and intra - state jealousies) collapsed. Although the Prussian king refused the German crown, the Prussians wanted to dominate German affairs. The Prussians took advantage of German popular uprisings in 1849 and began to exert military and political influence in order to gain hegemony over the German states. The only real objections to the Prussian moves into Germany were from the southern Palatinates of Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden who were aligned closely with the Austrians. However, the Prussian military made quick work of suppressing their objections. The Prussians restored the all - German Assembly within less than a year.

The Austrians could do little to stem Prussian advances into Germany because of problems they had trying to preserve their own interests in Italy and Hungary. In 1848, Austrians were engaged in a struggle to maintain the status of the Habsburg empire. Italians and Hungarian

Magyars were causing considerable difficulty for the Austrians.

In 1849, German states were being forced to offer the German crown to the Prussians once again with the condition that Austria would be excluded from involvement in German affairs. Major European powers were not supportive of a unified Germany under Prussian influence as that would condone an expansionist Prussian policy reminiscent of Frederick the Great's era. By 1850, Austrian problems in Italy and Hungary were put to rest so that Austria could focus on Germany. In 1850, Austria persuaded the Russian Government to join it in denying the Prussian King the right to assume the German crown. The Russian and Austrian Governments coerced the Prussians to abandon their efforts to dominate the German states in such a way that the whole affair was termed the "humiliation at Olmutz." The German Assembly was dissolved once again after the "humiliation at Olmutz." The loose confederation of German states was reestablished according to the provisions of the 1815 Congress of Vienna.

The central issue in the conflict between the Austrians and the Prussians was dominance over the German states. The Prussians recognized the German territory as historically theirs, while the Austrians were authorized dominance over the German states by the 1815 Congress of Vienna.

The most significant influence on the unification of Germany under Prussian domination was the statesmanship of Otto Von Bismarck. Engels described Prussian policy developed by Bismarck during the era of German unification as keeping an "iron fist in a velvet glove."<sup>42</sup> The following account will serve to validate Engels' observation.

In 1857, Bismarck was assigned to a Prussian post in the German Confederation.

Bismarck observed the economic and ethnic problems of the German states and was convinced that the German states should unite. He was also convinced that a unified Germany would be of great economic benefit to Prussia, if Prussia could maintain dominance over the German states. Bismarck became the Prime Minister of Prussia in 1862. In 1864, when Denmark proposed the annexation of Schleswig - Holstein, Bismarck persuaded the Austrian government to ally itself with the Prussians to defeat the Danes. This would bring the Schleswig - Holstein states closer to unification with other German states. The Danes were defeated and ceded the Schleswig - Holstein states to Austria and Prussia. Austria and Prussia could not agree on the administration of the two states. The disagreement between Austria and Prussia on the administration of Schleswig - Holstein was the issue that ultimately led to war.

According to Engels, Bismarck realized that "if Prussia was to achieve supremacy in Germany, it was necessary not only to drive Austria out of the German Confederation by force but also to subjugate the petty [German] states" of Saxony, Bavaria, Holstein, Wurtemberg and Baden, which were closely aligned with Austria.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, Bismarck knew that "peace with Austria foreshadowed war with France... [and a peace with Austria] was to be the means for completing the Prussian - German empire."<sup>44</sup> Bismarck realized that the unification of Germany under Prussian dominance would probably cause France to go to war with Prussia. Therefore, the survival of Germany in a Franco - Prussian war would require support, or non - aggression, from Austria.

Driving Austria out of the German Confederation was a difficult problem for Bismarck. Bismarck concluded that Prussia had to isolate, and then defeat, Austria in a war. Bismarck had to involve Austria in a war with Prussia in such a way that Austria appeared to be the aggressor. By having Austria appear to be the aggressor, and Prussia the defender, other European powers would not side with Austria. Bismarck developed a plan of political maneuvering that achieved the Prussian political ends.

In early 1866, Bismarck had the Prussian representative to the German Assembly formally propose that Austria should be excluded from all German affairs. The Austrians began to mobilize their military in March of 1866 as a result of the Prussian proposal. A series of claims and counter-claims between Prussia and Austria ensued about the future of the Schleswig - Holstein states until the Confederation, at the suggestion of Austria, mobilized its Federal army against Prussia on June 14, 1866. The mobilization of Austrian and German federal troops was tantamount to declaring war against Prussia. Bismarck had what he wanted... a war where Prussia appeared to be the defender. The issue to be settled was German unification under Prussian dominance. Conversely, the Austrians, "distracted by every variety of embarrassment, hoping for success, but unwilling to go to war, had kept on negotiating till the last moment... and had, in consequence, done little or nothing to secure effective preparation or initiative."<sup>45</sup>

The Prussians mobilized in May. Although the Prussians had less time to mobilize, they produced a larger and better trained force than the Austrians. It seemed that Austria had not taken time between wars to improve the quality of its armed forces. Conversely, the Prussian



military reform of the 1860's produced a rapidly expandable force as a part of the Landwehr system. In addition, the Prussians paid considerable attention to the American Civil War and learned many lessons such as the importance of the telegraph and the railroad. For example, by 1866 the Prussians had 4 railroads to transport their armies to the Prussian frontiers, where the Austrians only had one. Prussians made an extensive number of maps available to tactical level commanders, knew the Austrian order of battle, and planned their campaign to the minutest detail. The Prussians also armed their riflemen with the breech loading "needle gun" which had a quicker rate of fire than the muzzle loading French rifle. The Prussian military establishment ensured that its officers studied war during the inter-war years. The best of the Prussian officers were selected to serve in the General staff where they grew proficient in planning and commanding operations. When matched with the Prussians, the Austrians found themselves to be poorly led and equipped with outdated equipment.

Bismarck entered a series of treaties that would guarantee his success as war with Austria appeared imminent. Among them were treaties with the southern German states and Italy. The Austrians fought on two fronts at the outset of hostilities; one to the north with Prussia and one to the south with Italy. Problems on the Italian front prevented Austria from being able to mass an effective force against the Prussians.

The Austro-Prussian war culminated with a climactic battle on July 3rd and 4th at Koninggratz in what is now Czechoslovakia. The Austrian tactic was to fire their muzzle loading rifles in volleys and then rely on the bayonet as the enemy continued its advance. The Prussians

maneuvered on Koniggratz from three directions simultaneously and combined their maneuver with the rapid rifle fire capability which the needle gun gave them. Austrian positions were overrun. The Austrian Cavalry reserve was attacked while still in its assembly area. The Austrian army disintegrated and left the battlefield at Koniggratz as a confused mass. On the night of the battle of Koniggratz, Bismarck was heard to say: "The struggle is decided, the next thing thing to do is to regain Austria's friendship."<sup>46</sup> The Prussians allowed the disorganized Austrian retreat to the Elbe river without pursuit.

The Austrians attempted to negotiate an armistice on the 5th of July. The Austrian offer was refused by the Prussians because it offered armistice only. It did not address the issue of German unity or Prussian dominance in the affairs of the German state. An armistice would have allowed sufficient time for the Austrian Army to regroup and continue the war after gathering reinforcements from the Italian front.

The Prussians maintained contact with the Austrian Army as it retreated from the Elbe to Vienna, but no significant fighting ensued. The Prussians stopped outside of Vienna on the 18th of July and outnumbered the disorganized Austrians by fifty thousand soldiers. The King of Prussia wanted to enter Vienna to complete the destruction of the Austrian military. Bismarck could have supported the king's desire for the complete destruction of the Austrian military, state, and political systems. However, he convinced King Wilhelm to demonstrate restraint. Bismarck insisted that the Prussians stop outside of Vienna in order to begin the peace process on the terms for which the Prussians had fought. The Prussian King gave in to Bismarck's demands that the

Prussian attack stop and began negotiating a resolution for the conflict. Bismarck was certain that Austrian support was necessary in conflicts that were certain to ensue with France.

"Bismarck did not want to humiliate the Austrians nor impose such severe terms that they remained hostile in the years ahead. 'Later, we shall need Austria's strength for ourselves' he remarked."<sup>47</sup> Bismarck worked feverishly to complete the peace process with Austria before France or Russia had a chance to interfere with the Prussian plan.

Bismarck was careful to make sure that the French interest in the war with Austria did not upset efforts to resolve the conflict on Prussian terms. Bismarck sent envoys to query the Austrians, as well as Napoleon III, about their views on the terms for the treaty that would ensue. By coincidence, Napoleon III's views toward the Austrian defeat were similar to Prussian war aims. Napoleon accepted the unification of Germany to include the northern states of Schleswig - Holstein and the southern states to include Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg and Saxony. In return the Prussians accepted French hegemony in Luxembourg and Belgium. The French agreement to the peace terms guaranteed Bismarck that he had no reason to fear French interference with the resolution of the Austro - Prussian conflict.

The Austrians agreed to the terms proposed by the Prussians because they realized further efforts in the war would be futile. Prussian benevolence toward the Austrians served to preclude continued antagonism. All supporting Prussian attacks were victorious, yet troops were instructed not to pillage. All requisitions were promised to be paid in full. The Austrians left their wounded to the care of the Prussian ambulance and medical services as the Austrians lacked a

medical service during the battle of Koniggratz. The benevolence shown to the Austrians on the battlefield at Koniggratz, as well as not marching into Vienna, prompted an armistice and a lasting peace that was satisfactory to both Prussia and Austria.

The Prussian terms for terminating the conflict were clear and were understood by Austria and France. The peace treaty, which was agreed to on the 26th of July, stipulated that Austria would not lose any territory and would pay a small indemnity. In return, Austria would relinquish all control over the affairs of Germany which would be united under Prussian dominance. All terms were considered gracious as more severe terms could have been imposed.

Bismarck engineered a lasting peace with Austria by manipulating political situations to Prussia's benefit. For example, Bismarck's victory over Austria caused the ascendancy of the Hungarian Magyars to become the most powerful political force in the newly formed Austro - Hungarian empire. As a result, the Magyars resolutely prohibited any attempt by the Austrians to resume war with Prussia because it would threaten the Magyar power base in the Austro - Hungarian empire. The resulting state of Austrian political affairs was such that the survival of the Habsburg monarchy, and the Austro - Hungarian relationship, was dependent on ensuring adherence to the 1866 Austro - Prussian treaty.

As Bismarck predicted, the French were uneasy with the Prussian dominance of the newly unified Germany. The French demanded the left bank of the Rhine soon after the Austro - Prussian war had concluded. The French demands sparked a war with the Prussians. France counted on Austrian support in a war against Prussia. The Austrians never came because the

Hungarian Magyars did not want to become involved in problems along the Rhine. The Prussian victory in the Franco - Prussian war united all German states. This included the northern and southern states into a single *Reich* with Wilhelm I as its emperor and Bismarck as its first chancellor. Soon after the Franco - Prussian war the newly unified Germany began to dominate European commerce and political affairs.

*Analysis of the Conflict Resolution Between Austria and Prussia:*

1. What was the fundamental difference in truths, values, or interests? The issue was dominance over the unified German states. Prussia and Austria had reason to claim regional hegemony; Austria because of historic claims, as well as the authority of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, while Prussia maintained ethnic and historic claims.

2. What was the expected benefit to be gained from the conflict? An economic gain was the expected benefit because of the industrial and economic growth taking place in Central Europe at the time. Prussia wanted control of German ports in the north to allow access to major shipping routes and to increase the potential for greater trade. As Germany had the potential to dominate European commerce, the economic benefit would be reaped by whoever controlled the German states. How much risk was acceptable to the parties in the conflict in order to obtain benefit?

The Prussians were willing to risk war with other European powers in order to assume regional hegemony; however, they were not willing to risk war with all European powers simultaneously.

The Austrians did not want to risk losing control of the problems they were having throughout the Habsburg Empire by focusing exclusively on Prussian activities. Is the issue critical for the

continued survival or welfare of the states in the conflict? Prussia determined that domination of a united Germany was important to its economic development, future security and status as a European power. Austria did not have the same degree of motivation as the Prussians and continued domination of the German states was not critical to its continued survival. Austria was focused on the more critical issue of Italian and Hungarian control.

3. Are the states in the conflict capable of developing policy and objectives to terminate and resolve conflict? Both the Prussian and Austrian states had governments that were capable of creating and enforcing policy decisions. The governments of both Prussia and Austria were effective during the conduct of the war. Bismarck recognized that the destruction of the Austrian political infrastructure would not help in achieving the objective and would complicate or prevent a resolution of the conflict.

4. Is the motivation for involvement in the conflict great enough to cause a state to pursue a competitive conflict strategy? The Prussians recognized that the only way that they would be able to achieve hegemony over a unified Germany was to go to war with Austria. Other efforts to attain their objective in Germany were met with resistance from the Austrians as well as other European powers. While the Austrians were willing to compete with the Prussians on the issue of hegemony over Germany, they did not have the same degree of motivation that the Prussians had.

5. What conditions existed that enticed one state to escalate and create a crisis for the other state? The Prussians realized that the only way they would be able to dominate a unified

Germany was to ensure that Austria would not interfere with the internal affairs of Germany.

Austria would not willingly relinquish control of the German territories and had the support of the Russian and French Governments. The opportunity for escalation presented itself as Prussia realized that Austria was occupied with problems in other areas of the Habsburg empire and had not maintained its military preparedness. The Prussians had the advantage of a better prepared military force, internal stability and there were no overt attempts by any foreign power to encroach on any of its other interests. What caused the decision by the affected states to reciprocate or assume a position of advantage? The Austrians demonstrated in 1850 that they would not capitulate on the issue of dominance over the German states. The 1866 Austrian response to the Prussian proposal in the German Assembly was reflexive and not based on a prudent policy. The Austrian government was put into a situation by the Prussians where they had little choice but to reciprocate or else capitulate.

6. Can states sustain an absolute commitment to a conflict? No! Austria was fighting on two fronts and could not sustain a protracted war. A protracted war would have required that Austria receive assistance from allied forces. What affect did absolute commitment have on the state and its political objectives? There is little indication that absolute commitment affected the Prussian strategies. However, the limited objectives pursued by the Prussians are indicative of the limited number of resources that they were willing to commit in a conflict with the Austrians. What limits were imposed by a state for commitment to complete the conflict resolution process by agreement, compromise, or change with respect to the value, truth or interest? Prussia

apparently wanted to challenge only one national power at a time. It understood that it could not succeed against an allied force. Prussia was prepared to go to war against Austria in order to cause it to relinquish any claim that it had on the German states. Prussia did not establish the destruction of the Austrian military or the political state as its objective. This would have caused a sense of resentment rather than the support that Bismarck perceived to be necessary for the survival of a united Germany in central Europe. Without resolution of the conflict with Austria, the future of a unified Germany would have been in jeopardy.

7. Are intractable issues the basis for a conflict that is escalating and driving toward absolute commitment? The issues at conflict between the Prussians and the Austrians were not intractable. Is accommodation desirable or possible? Accommodation was not desirable. Prussia and Austria could not accommodate each others' interests as they attempted to settle the administration of the states of Schleswig - Holstein that they had acquired from Denmark.

8. Were either of the states susceptible to being coerced or did coercion provoke the use of force rather than facilitate deescalation or conflict resolution? Neither Prussia nor Austria were susceptible to being coerced. The balance of available power that Austria and Prussia were capable of bringing to bear in the conflict was about equal. The attempt by Austria to threaten the use of military force was quickly responded to by the Prussians as if it were a declaration of war. In this case, the attempt to coerce by the Austrians caused the Prussians to counter - escalate to the threat of the use of force.

9. Did policy and objectives serve to measure successful application of force and describe the



terms for terminating the use of force? The objectives that Bismarck had established provided a measure for the successful application of force. When the use of force had achieved the desired end, the use of force was no longer required and was not permitted. This was true of all of the battles and the surrounding of Austrian forces in Vienna.

10. Did states apply sufficient force to achieve a victory without jeopardizing the political purpose? The Prussians never applied more force than that which was required to defeat the Austrians or their supporting German military forces. Total destruction of the military or political infrastructure was not required or allowed by Bismarck.

11. Did the conflict transform... if so, how? The conflict was transformed within the German states that the Prussians occupied. For example, when the Prussians fought the Bavarians between Fulda and Hammelberg the Prussians did not seek to punish the Bavarians. Nor did the Prussians seek to punish the occupants of the city of Frankfurt, even though Frankfurt had been a stronghold of anti - Prussian sentiment. As the campaign came to a close, the Prussians had been benevolent not only to the Austrians, but also to the Germans that fought on the side of the Austrians. The effect was that the Germans, as well as the Austrians, learned that there was no reason to maintain a grudge against the Prussians. As the Austrians conceded defeat there was an immediate agreement established between the Prussians and the Austrians on Prussian terms.

How did transformation affect the issue? The Austrians, and most of the German states, were willing to abide by the Prussian terms whereas only seven weeks prior an agreement could not be reached. Did transformation facilitate resolution or was the conflict to remain at a latent level?

The issues were resolved with Austria. The Austrian issue was in transformation throughout the campaign and immediately thereafter. The issue continued to transform after the war. With the Austrian and Prussian military alliance of 1879, hegemony over the unified German states was no longer an issue of concern. Moreover, the Habsburg empire itself transformed to become the dual monarchy of the Austro - Hungarian empire. The Hungarian seat of power was held in the balance that evolved between Austria and Prussia. Therefore, the Hungarians forbade any attempts by the Austrians to pursue another war against the Prussians.

Austria did not enter into a war with Prussia during the 1871 Franco - Prussian war because of the Hungarian influence. Napoleon III enticed the southern states to fight against the Prussians again in 1871. However, Bismarck demonstrated a degree of benevolence toward the southern states after he defeated Napoleon III at Sedan. On the other hand, the French loss of Alsace and Lorraine caused a protracted conflict that continued into the 20th Century.

12. How did the states ensure the willing and satisfactory agreement, compromise or change so that the disputed issues were resolved? The Prussians were benevolent toward the Austrians and the Germans, during and after the campaign. The terms were not so harsh as to create a lasting resentment of the treaty. The Austrians learned quickly that it would be to their benefit to agree to the peace proposal offered by the Prussians. In contrast to the willing agreement of the Austrians, the Prussian humiliation at Olmutz in 1850 strengthened the Prussian resolve to achieve their objective of domination over the German states.

13. Why were the states unable or unwilling to communicate with other states during the conflict

to ensure understanding about the issues? Bismarck did communicate with both the Austrians and the French during the campaign to ensure that they understood the terms that the Prussians were seeking for the termination of the conflict and resolution. As a result of Bismarck's efforts to communicate freely with Austria and France, he reduced the levels of suspicion about Prussian intent toward the Austrians and other European nations.

Conclusions: Bismarck purposely designed the lasting peace that was agreed to between the Prussians and the Austrians. The objectives for the conflict were developed and understood by the Prussians before they decided to escalate to war. The purpose of the use of force, and the amount of force to be used, was calculated and adhered to by the Prussians. The Prussians realized that the security of the unified German states under Prussian dominace could only happen if a lasting peace was established with Austria. The Prussians realized that military victory was only a way to achieve its political ends. Bismarck did not allow any incident in the war to jeopardize the potential for a peace agreement on Prussian terms. **The Prussian military victory created the opportunity for the Prussians to offer the Austrians a proposal for peace.** The terms offered the Austrians were not considered harsh and would allow the Austrians to recover without undue cost or humiliation. The limited objectives that Bismarck pursued served to transform the Austrian state such that the future of Germany was politically and economically secured. The Prussian victory also launched the Hungarian ascendancy to power in the Austro - Hungarian empire. The Hungarian power base in the Austro - Hungarian empire was dependent on the security of the German states. The Hungarians precluded any future Austrian retribution

against Germany. Bismarck's policies transformed relations between Prussia and Austria. As a result, a lasting peace between the two states was ensured.

## A Conflict Resolution Model

"...it did not take long for them to start wondering if they had really won the war or not, for it was soon evident that they had not won the peace."<sup>48</sup>

Hobbs

The intent of this section is to depict the relationship of the components of a conflict as described in previous sections. The model is described in three parts: initiating the conflict resolution process, escalation to facilitate a resolution, and resolution. The model assumes that a state has elected to pursue a competitive strategy for a conflict. The model, and the questions of history listed earlier, provide a way to examine conflict resolution.

*Initiating the Conflict Resolution Process:* It is imperative "not to take the first step [in a conflict] without considering the last."<sup>49</sup> The last step is conflict resolution. The first step is "being clear" in our mind about what we intend to achieve and how we intend to achieve it.<sup>50</sup>

Being clear about what we intend to achieve in a conflict is understanding what benefits are possible and what losses are to be avoided. Being clear on how we intend to achieve the political ends in a conflict is to understand the strategies possible, given the costs we are willing to incur.

Anticipated benefit gives purpose to a conflict while motivation determines the strategy to


be followed and investments to be made. The strategy for a conflict relates process (ways and means) to the expected benefit (ends). Conflicts are resolved via a cooperative strategy if the perceived benefits are mutual. Conversely, a high degree of motivation to gain or prevent loss causes a competitive strategy to be pursued. The strategy a state pursues in a conflict indicates the degree of risk it is willing to assume. Generally speaking, a cooperative strategy poses little risk while a competitive strategy poses a greater degree of risk to the participating states.

The conflict shown in the Table 1 example is of a cooperative strategy where the benefit was determined to be mutual. Therefore, the states are attracted to a compromise solution to produce a mutually beneficial outcome. A cooperative strategy results in a solution where both states' interests are equally represented. The final form of the solution in a cooperative strategy is not important. The importance of a cooperative strategy is the mutual benefit derived from achieving the best solution. The critical function is determining the best, mutually beneficial solution.

The Table 1 example of a competitive strategy assumes that the states in a conflict are not motivated to achieve mutually beneficial results. Accordingly, the conflict repels the two states as they are unwilling to agree or compromise on the issue. The relationship of coexistence between states in a conflict can be maintained through accommodation if neither state pursues the conflict any further. Accommodation is possible if the motivation, or the means, to overcome an opposing point of view are lacking. Accommodation between two states on an issue occurs when neither state wants to agree or compromise and there is insufficient motivation to escalate.

**Table 1: Initiating The Conflict Resolution Process.**

0.....	Motivation / Perceived Utility / Objectives.....	>+
0.....	Cost / Risk / Commitment.....	>+
0.....	Application of Economic / Diplomatic Power.....	>+
+<.....	Cooperative Strategy .....	>- <..... Competitive Strategy.....>+



<.....	Conflict.....	>+
<.....	Assessing Opportunities for Resolution, Offers to Resolve.....	>
<.....	"Real War".....	>

A state that is motivated to "win" at the expense of another state escalates to assume the advantage. The advantage gained by one state over another creates an imbalance in their relationship and creates a crisis for the disadvantaged state. The crisis felt by the disadvantaged

state is manifested in the requirement for a timely decision to capitulate, reciprocate, counter - escalate to assume a position of greater advantage itself, or change its view of the issue. The goal of a competitive strategy is "winning."

*Escalating Conflict to Achieve Resolution:*

The scale of effort made by a state while pursuing a competitive strategy is dependent on its motivation and political objectives. Objectives define the limits of effort applied to achieve the desired end in a conflict. Objectives are based on an understanding of the character of the opposing state, the opposing state's objectives and the resources available.


The scale of effort for employment of power in a conflict is continuous. The process of political assessment and reaction to a crisis, "the real war," occurs throughout a conflict.

Diplomatic or economic sanctions alone may suffice to "win" over an opponent at the lower end of the scale of effort. Conversely diplomatic and economic sanctions by themselves may be inadequate to win. Motivation to "win" in a conflict may cause one state to escalate and commit greater amounts of national power to achieve a desired end in order to dominate another. For this reason, Clausewitz warns that governments should not "rely on half - hearted politics" lest they meet a foe who "knows no power but his own."<sup>51</sup>

The greater the motivation, the greater the potential for a state to pursue an absolute level of commitment. The absolute commitment of a state represents the higher end of the scale of effort. A state that approaches the absolute level of commitment willingly commits all of its elements of power, to include diplomatic, economic, and military means. The ways in which

power is employed at the absolute level are constrained and restrained by the state's political ends.

**Table 2: Escalating The Conflict to Achieve Resolution.**





Competition between two states, as represented in Table 2, is preceded by a period where the states are in equilibrium and no positive effort is made by one to dominate another. A state escalates to achieve a position of advantage when the benefit is sufficient to motivate the state to act. Escalation continues until a state overwhelms its opponent and causes it to succumb (i.e., the military victory in 1866), or causes the issue to be abandoned as the cost exceeds the benefit.

Military forces are prepared to be employed during an escalation in order to gain advantage or to prevent loss with respect to the issue. Military power, once committed, works to defeat the enemy. The meaning of defeat should be specified by objectives such as to render the enemy militarily and politically impotent, or do what ever is required to preclude redress.

Military victory, economic embargoes and diplomatic sanctions are not the end toward which a state in a conflict works. Policy should determine how military victories, embargoes, and diplomatic sanctions contribute to the transformation of an opponent so that conflict resolution is possible.

#### Resolving Conflict:

States have to be willing to change to resolve conflict. The problem is that a state which is motivated to pursue a competitive strategy is not initially motivated to change. The challenge is thus: how does a state transform another so that the divergent views on an issue move toward the winner's viewpoint.

The key is understanding the utility of escalation. **Nothing is gained if a state escalates only to dominate and not exploit the advantage.** The crisis period is when the state is most

susceptible to change. Therefore, escalation is useful if it creates a crisis within the opposing state that can be exploited by immediate offers of incentives for change.

Table 3: Resolving The Conflict.




Table 3 provides an example where a state applies all the elements of its power to dominate another state throughout a conflict. **Escalation results in a crisis which requires a decision to reciprocate, escalate, capitulate or transform.** The factors that cause the disadvantaged state in table 3 to transform initially are not shown, but could include internal factors such as dwindling resources, dwindling popular support or a realization that the benefit is not worth the continued level of effort. Moreover, the transformation could have been caused by repeated offers of incentives to terminate the conflict and transform.


The use of force as shown in table 3 continues although transformation has begun. The use of force should reinforce the transformation process and culminates with a military defeat that brings about an armistice where both states agree to at least a temporary termination of the use of force. Ultimately, the transformation process continues after the armistice so that a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship is developed between the two states.

States willingly agree or compromise so that a value, truth, or interest that was disputed at the outset of the conflict is resolved and is no longer an issue of contention. The process of transformation should be nurtured by the winner to ensure that the transformation process is not left to chance. Ideally, the continuous process of transformation will cause the once divergent interests, values or truths to converge. However, unlike a cooperative strategy, the critical aspect of the resolution that concludes a conflict where the strategies were competitive is that the convergence of values, truths or interests more approximate the winner's rather than the loser's views.

Summary:

A conflict continues until at least a temporary agreement is reached by all states involved, although extensive efforts can be made to overcome an opponent by military means to achieve "victory," economic embargoes or diplomatic sanctions. Agreement is caused by a change so that the fundamental difference that was the basis for the conflict has been resolved. The change, or transformation, of an opponent's view on an issue is the way to achieve resolution and peace. Therefore, the main effort in a conflict is to cause a transformation in the opponent's view of the issue. Everything else is secondary. Until transformation results in an agreement on the issue in conflict, nothing is won or lost.

Table 4: Summary of the Conflict Resolution Process



## Application of the Conflict Resolution Model

"...every war must be conceived as a single whole, and that with his first move the general must already have a clear idea of the goal on which all lines are to converge."<sup>52</sup>

Clausewitz

The intent of this section is to describe the challenges to transformation of an opponent's view on an issue. This paper determined in previous sections that *timing* for offering a resolution is best when a state is in a crisis condition. Now the focus shifts to what needs to happen once the crisis has been created so that resolution is achieved. This section begins by describing characteristics that an effective strategist must demonstrate.

### Art and Science in Conflict

A strategist cannot be expected to apply a single procedure to succeed in all conflicts as no two conflicts can be expected to be alike. The knowledge of what to do is overshadowed by the requirement for creative ability. Clausewitz describes "creative ability" as an objective of art.<sup>53</sup> A need for "creative" strategists is important because they, like artists, must "occasionally be able to live in a world out of joint."<sup>54</sup> A strategist must not only know the relationship of all the variables associated with a conflict, the strategist must also have the "artistic" ability to create solutions where before there were none.

Much has been studied in the U.S. military about "operational art," which is concerned with the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives within a

theater" of war.<sup>55</sup> Operational art as described above is inadequate for our purposes because it is limited to the application of military forces. Art at the strategic level requires the creative application of all of the elements of national power. Strategic art is defined within this paper as the ability to create conditions that not only guarantee the survival of a state, its values, truths, and interests but also their promotion. The strategic artist synchronizes strategic ways and means to create the opportunities for conflict resolution, the desired end, through the transformation of an opponent's view on an issue.

#### *What Causes Transformation in Conflict?*

To escalate to a position of advantage and create a crisis within an opponent is not enough. It cannot be assumed that a state will renounce its position on an issue and transform immediately when it is placed in a crisis condition. Kuhn's three alternatives to crisis in science apply, with a little modification, to a conflict.<sup>56</sup> The three modified alternatives include:

1. The current political system proves to be able to handle the crisis without capitulation or transformation on the issue.
2. The crisis conditions resist radical new approaches within the political system and there is no motivation to transform on the issue. The state concludes that there is no favorable solution forthcoming in the present state of affairs and elects to terminate the conflict so that a future generation can take up the issue when conditions permit favorable resolution.
3. The crisis creates a candidate for transformation of the issue. The state is then embroiled in an internal conflict over the merit and acceptance of the transformation.

The most beneficial of the three alternatives listed involves transformation. The *current political system* must be persuaded to transform on the issue as soon as possible. A whole new set of problems are likely to develop as the state becomes embroiled in an internal conflict if transformation is forced through the government. This is particularly true if it means abandoning popularly accepted objectives. The potential for renewed conflict is great if the hostility associated with a government - forced transformation is not overcome. Transformation will facilitate conflict resolution if the rationale for transformation is internalized first and then represented in government policy. The solution probably lies in popular support. **To be effective over the long term, transformation must be a result of a demand for change coming from the popular base, from the ground up, rather than from the government, or top down.**

The rates of transformation within a state can be either slow or rapid in nature. A slow transformation is **evolutionary** in nature as it is assumed that a series of minor adjustments over a lengthy period of time will produce the desired effects. Conversely, a rapid transformation is **revolutionary** in nature as it requires a rapid, major adjustment to produce the desired effect. A rapid transformation is desirable in a conflict; however, revolutionary transformation disrupts the status quo within a state. Rapid transformation requires popular support. Popular support is gained by convincing the state's population that rapid acceptance of the proposed transformation will be to their advantage.


A state in crisis determines its future by analyzing its predicament and available courses of action. A state in crisis will likely consider options that are developed through a problem solving

technique as described in table 5.<sup>57</sup> The state that caused the crisis must know what solutions are acceptable to the state in a crisis condition and how to introduce them in order to cause the desired transformation.

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Table 5: Fisher's Circle Chart: Four Basic Steps in Inventing Options

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Acceptable solutions will meet little resistance. The state that escalates to create a crisis in another has to offer acceptable solutions. These must appeal to the most powerful of interests, basic human needs in order to eliminate resistance to transformation. Popular support for transformation is gained through an appeal to basic human needs. Appealing to basic human needs like "control over one's life, security, economic well-being, sense of belonging, and



recognition" reduces resistance to transformation.<sup>54</sup> Appeals for popular support should coincide with offers to share interests; giving each state a "stake" in the transformation of the state in crisis. Assurances of shared interests will facilitate conflict resolution. Where possible, efforts to share interests for mutual gain, and "dovetailing" of differing interests should facilitate transformation on an issue. Influencing the state while in crisis and gaining popular support by appealing to basic human needs and offering to share in interest development will likely produce a lasting transformation. Conversely, coercion will not facilitate a transformation.

### *The Strategic Paradox.*

The elements of national power are applied to cause an opponent to change his goals, cease hostilities, and negotiate for peace. A tentative peace may come with the cessation of hostilities, but the opponent's domestic political situation may be such that he lacks the decisive authority to reach and execute a resolution to the conflict. Similarly, decapitation of a government could have the same result; a cessation of hostilities without a government that can achieve resolution.

Often, motivation in a conflict causes the destruction of an opponent. Although destruction of an opponent results in a physical change, his character may remain unchanged. The superficial victory that is claimed with the destruction of an opponent is not a "final victory." The fundamental differences that caused the conflict remain latent until they are transformed. Destruction of an opponent in order to "win" a short - term victory may preclude long term peace.

Transforming an opponent's character so that he is willing to reach an agreement or accept a truth, value, or interest is the way to achieve a "final victory." Therefore, changing the collective mind of an opponent has to be the strategist's focus. If destruction of an opponent is required, then it is imperative that the effects of the destruction are understood and planned for. The nature of a competitive strategy is that one side has to lose. A government that "loses" in a conflict is likely to lose credibility and decisive authority among its population. Even if there was no effort made to decapitate an opponent's government, the internal political upheavals that would probably ensue as a result of "losing" could result in chaos. Decapitating an opponent eliminates the recognized and decisive authority within a state and the means to regulate internal conflicts that are associated with transformation. Without a recognized authority, any agreement reached in an effort to resolve a conflict will be suspect.

Effective transformation within an opponent's leadership requires the presence of a decisive authority as well as popular support. Strategies for conflict have to be developed accordingly. As a crisis is presented to an opponent during a conflict, alternatives for termination and resolution should also be offered. If an opponent's government is unwilling to act upon the proposed alternatives for transformation and resolution, then one's strategy must include provisions for empowering an acceptable substitute authority. Popular recognition and acceptance of an alternative authority will produce change. The challenge is to empower an authority that demonstrates that he holds the values, truths, and interests that will result in the desired transformation. The historical example demonstrated that empowering the Magyars

caused the immediate transformation that Bismarck wanted (exclusion of Austrian involvement in German affairs).

A strategy for destroying a government as part of resolving a conflict must include provisions for reestablishing decisive authority. A problem associated with the destruction of a government is gaining popular support for its successor. Until popular support is gained, the transformation may be suspect. Therefore, the strategist should consider the prevention of the destruction of the opponent's government (as demonstrated by Bismarck on the outskirts of Vienna) unless an alternate government is available. Alternatives offered to an opposing government, when it is in a crisis situation, include opportunities for meaningful change or the threat of continued loss. The opportunity for precluding continued loss along with other incentives can be translated by the opponent into a "relative victory." The outcome of a competitive strategy as described could be translated as a win - win solution and the likelihood of popular support for the government and the proposal would then be greater.

If destruction is unavoidable, then the strategist has two problems to contend with: establishing popular support for transformation and reestablishing a decisive authority in the absence of a viable government. In the cases of destroying or not destroying the government infrastructure, gaining popular support and recognizing an alternative authority as decisive requires a cooperative rather than competitive process. Any strategy to achieve a "final victory" has to consider how the victor is to cause an otherwise unwilling opponent to take the actions required for resolution of a conflict.

When all of the elements of national power are committed in a conflict, the need is great to ensure that there is a common understanding of objectives among all of the participants. For example, the strict orders that were given to the Prussian military not to pillage during the 1866 war facilitated a lasting resolution among the Prussians and the otherwise hostile German states. Similarly, "rules of engagement" have to be drawn from strategic objectives and then strictly enforced. Otherwise, an overly zealous military campaign can threaten "final victory" and turn a short - term victory into a long term defeat.

#### Summary.

The desired end in a conflict that employs a competitive strategy is a change in the opponent's view on a critical issue. The change, or transformation, should be long lasting so as to preclude a recurrence of the conflict over the same issue at a later time. A conflict can become latent, giving the appearance of termination if there is no formal resolution. "Winning" using a competitive strategy means that the opponent's view of a critical issue becomes aligned with the escalating state. Nothing is won or lost until the opponents agree or compromise on an issue.

The strategist employs all the elements of national power in a conflict to create conditions of crisis within an opponent. The strategist must have a scheme to cause transformation while the state is in crisis because the state is most susceptible to change during crisis. The development of a crisis creates a fleeting "window of opportunity" which will be lost unless a well developed plan to cause transformation is implemented immediately. The plan for causing a transformation within an opponent should seek to gain popular support as well as providing assurances that the

transformation is a shared interest. Popular support and a demonstration of mutual interest will serve as the impetus from which lasting change will come.

Transformation is facilitated by "empowering" an authority to introduce and ensure change. Transformation required for conflict resolution will be left to chance if a state is left without a recognized, decisive authority to make it happen.

States are more likely to agree or compromise on the issue that was the basis of the conflict once a transformation occurs. Resolution, the last step in a conflict, has to be planned before a state becomes involved in a conflict. Empowering an authority, creating strategies and opportunities for transformation and conflict resolution are the responsibilities of the strategic artist.

## Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Study

Conflict termination and conflict resolution are terms that are used interchangeably throughout the military. The criteria for military success in a conflict has generally equated to victory. Unfortunately, the view of many strategists parallels the military's criteria for success in a conflict.

The U.S. military has grown intellectually during the last fifteen years. The military's understanding of operational art was evident in the U.S. - led coalition war with Iraq. The

military victory was unparalleled. Now, the U.S. must demonstrate the same growth at the strategic level so that military victories, such as the one in the Persian Gulf, will contribute to a conflict resolution and a lasting peace. The potential for increased conflict places great emphasis on the need for resolution. Any future conflict that the United States enters into should be clearly understood before the conflict is joined. U.S. strategists have to develop the "strategic art" just as the operational art was developed.

The following conclusions are provided with associated recommendations where applicable.

1. There is a lack of common understanding within the military and other U.S. Government agencies about what conflict, conflict termination, and conflict resolution are.

**Recommendations:**

- a. Develop a definition for conflict. The definition should include the relationships between conflict and war; conflict termination and conflict resolution; and, the elements of national power as applied in a conflict.
- b. Increase the conflict termination / resolution instruction provided within the U.S. Military Senior Service Schools. Develop an accepted theory for conflict resolution. Validate theory through examination of historical and contemporary problems of conflict resolution.

2. Escalation in a conflict over intractable issues will not result in agreement about a value or truth in question. The diversity of values and truths held by governments with which the U.S. must interact requires that the U.S. seek accommodation rather than a "win" on intractable issues.
3. The use of force to coerce an opponent in a conflict will not, on its own, cause the opponent to transform.
4. Force should be applied in a conflict only in accordance with established policy. Policy should serve to dictate the reasons for the use of force and then serve to measure the effectiveness of the force when applied.
5. Transformation is key to conflict resolution. The Cold War and the Gulf War victories have yet to complete the transformation process. The potential for the recurrence of conflict and armed hostilities remain as long as the transformation of the former Soviet Union and Iraq has not taken place. The United States has claimed victory and "gone home" to look inward while Russia and Iraq are left to transform on their own... if they transform at all.

**Recommendation:** Continue studies to determine how transformation can be caused within the former Soviet Union and Iraq.

6. The questions developed within the paper facilitated understanding of how a nation can work

to resolve a conflict while using a competitive strategy.

**Recommendation:** Apply the questions developed within this paper to other historical and contemporary problems of conflict resolution. Validate the questions through repeated application to historical and contemporary problems. Modify and refine the questions as necessary to develop a better measure of success for conflict resolution. Once verified through repeated application, determine if any of the questions warrant restatement and definition as a principle.

7. Bismarck demonstrated an outstanding grasp of the requirements for bringing the conflict between the Austrians and the Prussians to a successful resolution. There is little historical data available on how he developed the scheme to resolve the conflict as most historical accounts concern themselves with the battle only. Unfortunately, Bismarck died before anyone could interview him to gain an insight into how he maneuvered through the political situation to "win."

**Recommendations:**

a. Determine if the strategist responsible for a successful conflict resolution provided an account of the process. Determine if it is possible to conduct an interview with a strategist who successfully engineered a conflict resolution. Develop a series of questions, similar to those in this paper, to structure an interview with a successful strategist.

b. Apply any "lessons learned" from the study of a successful conflict resolution to the list of questions already developed for validation by applying them to historical studies of



conflict resolution.

8. Maneuvering in a conflict is achieved through escalation to gain advantage. The advantage a state has over another is the creation of a crisis condition which disrupts an opponent's plan for the conduct of a conflict. The benefit of maneuver is lost if there isn't a scheme for offering incentives for transformation during a crisis.

**Recommendation:** Examine historical examples to determine what plans for causing change were evident as one state escalated to create a crisis condition for another.

9. Sometimes it is better to attack an intractable conflict through an evolutionary versus revolutionary transformation process. The problem with an evolutionary transformation is the need to monitor the progress of change in order to provide additional incentives for change if required.

**Recommendations:**

a. Determine the conditions when an evolutionary transformation would be more favorable than a revolutionary transformation.

b. Determine how a strategy for evolutionary transformation should be developed.

10. Knowing what will cause an opponent to change is key to terminating hostilities and resolving conflict.

**Recommendations:**

- a. Strategic intelligence collection efforts should focus on how conflicts can be resolved.
- b. Strategic intelligence collection efforts should focus on who is to be empowered in the event that an opponent's government is destroyed.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1971), 114.

<sup>2</sup> John Hammerton, "From War to War: My Prophecy of 1918," in The War Illustrated, ed. John Hammerton (London: The Amalgamated Press, April 26, 1940), 446.

<sup>3</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, indexed ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 80.

<sup>4</sup> Richard Hobbs, The Myth of Victory: What is Victory in War? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), 72.

<sup>5</sup> Clausewitz, 159, 582.

<sup>6</sup> Maurice Hankey, Politics, Trials, and Errors, (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1950), 52.

<sup>7</sup> Morton Deutsch, Conflict and its Resolution, (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1965), 21 - 23.

<sup>8</sup> Bryant Wedge, "Conflict Management: The State of the Art," in New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, ed. Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (Washington Square: New York University Press, 1987), 279.

<sup>9</sup> Robert Woito, ed., To End War: A New Approach to International Conflict, 6th ed. (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1982), 63.

<sup>10</sup> Deutsch, "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution," in New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991), 31.

<sup>11</sup> T.R. Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research, (New York: Free Press, 1980), 2.

<sup>12</sup> Deutsch, Conflict and its Resolution, 41 - 43.

<sup>13</sup> Deutsch, "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution," 31.

<sup>14</sup> Fred Ikle', Every War Must End, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 35.

<sup>15</sup> Clausewitz, 221.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 218 - 222.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 593.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 580.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 584.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> L. Kriesberg, Terrell Northrup, and Stuart Thorson, eds., Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 50 - 52.

<sup>22</sup> Bruce B.G. Clarke, Conflict Termination: A Rational Model, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 12.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Hanson Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, (New York: Harper, 1950), 107 - 108.

<sup>26</sup> Sun Tzu, 110.

<sup>27</sup> Hobbs, 1 - 10.

<sup>28</sup> Liddel Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Meridian, 1991), 366.

<sup>29</sup> Ikle', 80.

<sup>30</sup> Peter Wallenstein, "Resolution and Termination of International Conflicts," in New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991), 129.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 130.

<sup>32</sup> Raimo Vayrynen, ed., New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991), 1 - 23.

<sup>33</sup> Lewis Coser, "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change," in Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the Social Sciences, ed. Clagett Smith (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 490.

<sup>34</sup> Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 166.

<sup>35</sup> Coser, 490.

<sup>36</sup> Wallenstein, 131.

<sup>37</sup> Jeffery Rubin, "The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing," in Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts, eds. Kriesberg L. and Stuart Thorson, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991). Rubin's thesis is that the opportunity for conflict resolution has to be created.

<sup>38</sup> Ikle', 59.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 69.

<sup>40</sup> Gordon Craig, From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), 19.

<sup>41</sup> Frederick Engels, The Role of Force in History: A Study of Bismarck's Policy of Blood and Iron, trans. Jack Cohen (New York: International Publishers, 1968).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 69.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 63.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> T. Miller Maguire, The Campaign in Bohemia 1866, (London: William Clowes and Sons LTD, 1908), 9.

<sup>46</sup> F.D. Ian, Bismarck, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1957), 46.

<sup>47</sup> Alan Palmer, Bismarck, (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1976), 123.

<sup>48</sup> Hobbs, 234.

<sup>49</sup> Clausewitz, 584.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 579.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 219.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 583.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 148.

<sup>54</sup> Kuhn, 79.

<sup>55</sup> Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (TEST) (Washington: Joint Staff, 10 January, 1992), GL - 9.

<sup>56</sup> Kuhn, 84.

<sup>57</sup> Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, ed., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 68.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 48.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 73.

Appendix A: Woitto's "Causes of War." (Woitto, Robert. To End War: A New Approach to International Conflict. New York: Pilgrim Press, Ch 3, 1982) to Seeking a Final Victory.

### **Internal Conflicts:**

1. *Right of Revolution against tyranny...* alteration or abolition of tyrannical government. Adherents in decolonization.
2. *Relative Deprivation...* perception of disproportionate provisions from society.
3. *Urban Class Conflict...* reaction to state erected legal and social barriers to upward mobility.
4. *Rural Class Conflict...* similar to urban class conflict.
5. *Right of Self - Determination...* causes include persistent discrimination, persecution or other violations of human rights.
6. *Irredentist Movements...* seeks to unite in one state all people of a similar ethnic, national or religious background, or to recover territory that was once part of an existing state.

### **Internal Sources of International Conflicts:**

1. *Flawed National Tradition...* i.e., a national culture that is expansionist, aggressive, or xenophobic.
2. *Internal Cohesion Through External Conflict...* focuses attention of the populace on an external enemy and away from domestic problems.
3. *Capitalism...* production requires expansion and is based on self interest... war ensues when these interests cannot be achieved on desired terms.
4. *State Socialism...* efforts to expand an economy similar to capitalism. The difference is that the management of the economy and affairs of state are in the same hands thereby increasing the potential for conflict.
5. *Autocratic Government...* arrogance and drive for power in international matters.
6. *Military Industrial Complex...* benefit provided by arms development and production justifies conflict expansion.
7. *National Ethnocentrism...* arrogant pride produces an unwillingness to compromise.

### **Causes of Conflict Originating in Relations Between States:**

1. *Drives for Hegemony...* an attempt to gain a preponderance of power and influence over others.
2. *Colonialism...* conflict due to displacement of inhabitants when attempting to establish a colony.
3. *Imperialism...* the rule of one state over another by the threat of war.
4. *Imbalance of Power...* exploiting an advantage over another state.
5. *Misperception...* misunderstanding the intent of other states.
6. *Absence of Law...* the absence of legal remedies increases the probability of conflict escalation.

7. *Real Differences...* the incompatibility between states provides the means to advance or defend them.



Appendix B: Handel's "Decisions to Terminate, or not to Terminate Hostilities." (Handel, Michael I. War Termination: A Critical Survey. Jerusalem, Israel: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978, p. 37) to Seeking a Final Victory.

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#### **Decision in Favor Of Termination**

##### **Expectations that:**

- The situation is deteriorating politically, militarily or economically.
- Time is on the enemy's side: minimize or cut losses while it is still possible.
- Military setbacks, defeat, stalemate or attrition; the limits of war potential have been reached or exhausted.
- No external support is forthcoming or expected.
- Domestic situation unstable: social and political unrest, morale low or declining, economic problems.
- Little or nothing can be gained even if a victory is possible; war goals are unattainable.
- The enemy offers convenient, reasonably lenient terms for conclusion of war.
- A break for negotiations will work to our advantage.


#### **Decision Against Termination**

##### **Expectations that:**

- Circumstances are in favor or show signs of improving politically, militarily, or economically.
  - Time is on our side or the enemy's situation is deteriorating more rapidly than ours.
  - Gains can be maximized and/or a continuation of the fighting will help cut losses; military situation is improving (or will) and our war potential has not been fully actualized.
  - External support is being received or will soon arrive.
  - Domestic situation stable: morale high and public continues to support war effort.
  - A "time out" will work to our enemy's benefit.
  - Terms the enemy offers are tough, excessively demanding and unacceptable.
  - Initiating negotiations will weaken our bargaining position.
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Appendix C: Wedge's "Conflict Management Continuum" (Wedge, Bryant. "Conflict Management: The State of The Art." Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications. Sandole, Dennis J.D. and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds.). Washington Square, New York: New York University Press, 1987, p. 280) to Seeking a Final Victory.



NOTE: This paper's application of the conflict management continuum does not focus on "violence" as provided by Wedge. The important aspects discussed within this paper are the options the state has to challenge, escalate or to back down.

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